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1.  
Introduction: Diversity and the JAC¶V)LUVW7HQ<HDUV 
Graham Gee and Erika Rackley 
 
This is an age of diversity. In a pluralistic polity such as the UK, diversity often serves as 
shorthand for a series of related questions about how best to respond to our mutual 
differences of, amongst other things, gender, race, sexuality and social background. Over the 
last twenty-five years or so there has been growing recognition that these questions are as 
relevant to the courts and tribunals as for other areas of public life. Today, across the UK, 
there is widespread agreement that the judiciary should reflect the society it serves. Especially 
welcome is the evidence in recent years that this agreement traverses the judicial and political 
spheres, with the need for faster and more visible progress on judicial diversity increasingly 
acknowledged across the ideological spectrum. There is, in other words, a political salience to 
debates about judicial diversity largely absent just a few years ago. This has significant spill-
over effects for the design, working and assessment of judicial appointments: previously 
relatively discrete debates about the independence, legitimacy and accountability of the 
appointment regime are frequently now framed in terms of, and by reference to, widely 
shared concerns about the need for judges who are more visibly reflective of society. 
Diversity is not the only goal of a selection regime of course, but it has begun to shape how 
those other goals are viewed. In brief, there is now such widespread agreement about its 
importance that judicial diversity µKDVLQUHFHQW\HDUVEHFRPHDWUXWKDOPRVWXQLYHUVDOO\
DFNQRZOHGJHG¶1  
 
Although most now accept the pressing need for a more diverse judiciary, there is 
considerably less agreement about the implications of recognizing diversity as an important 
goal of the judicial appointments regime. In fact, beneath the veneer of agreement that a 
diverse judiciary is²all else being equal²normatively desirable, there is substantial 
disagreement about almost everything else including the methods, forms, timescales and 
justifications for bringing it about. Differently put: the risk is that the consensus amongst 
politicians, judges, lawyers, officials and lay people about the need for a diverse judiciary 
conceals tricky and largely unaddressed questions about not only how to achieve diversity, 
but also the very meaning of diversity in this context. Some questions have a conceptual 
orientation. For instance, precisely how diverse is a diverse judiciary? Do understandings of 
diversity change if we think in terms of the over-representation of traditionally privileged 
                                                        
1
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groups rather than the under-representation of historically marginalized groups? How is 
judicial diversity best secured when the wider social environment is informed by entrenched 
patterns of power, privilege and perhaps even prejudice? Do changes to the judicial role ²a 
greater emphasis on leadership, case management and communicating with litigants and the 
public at large²suggest that traditional understandings of µmerit¶ need to evolve? Other 
questions are more practical. For example, how does the need to diversify the judiciary align 
with policies on retirement? What degree and sort of involvement in appointment processes 
for judges, ministers, lawyers and lay people helps or hinders the pursuit of diversity? What 
lessons²if any²can be drawn from the approach to promoting diversity in other legal 
systems? 
 
This collection brings together current and retired judges, officials, lawyers and academics 
from Australia, Canada, South Africa and the UK to debate these and other questions. It is the 
first collection investigating diversity debates in light of the changed institutional terrain of 
judicial appointments in England and Wales. 7KHFROOHFWLRQ¶V premise is that debates about 
diversity are complex and interrelated, with transformation of the MXGLFLDU\¶Vcomposition 
likely only via a systematic and collaborative approach. Systematic insofar as diversity must 
be addressed not only within the appointments process itself, but when thinking about a 
myriad of other matters as well: retention as well as recruitment; the terms and conditions of 
judicial service; the provision of training; arrangements for judicial welfare; promotion and 
professional development across a career; policies on retirement and post-retirement and so 
forth.2 A systematic approach also extends more broadly to include thinking about how 
judicial recruitment is influenced by multiple political and social changes, including changes 
to the public sector, legal regulatory regimes, legal labour markets and the career choices and 
working arrangements of lawyers. Insofar as debates about diversity should be informed by 
the perspectives, experiences and insights of the many different actors with a stake in the 
judicial system, the approach must also be collaborative.3 This requires, at a bare minimum, 
that all of those with a stake in the judicial system engage in good faith, reasoned and 
constructive debate. Of course no single collection could address all of the interrelated issues 
implicated in these debates nor include all of the perspectives on them. All that having been 
said, this collection strives to discuss a number of conceptual and practical questions relating 
to judicial diversity, and to do so via several lenses: judicial and non-judicial, legal and lay; 
                                                        
2
 The Report of the Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity 2010 at para 4. 
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practitioner and academic; domestic and international; analytical and experiential; and insider 
and outsider.  
 
Debates about diversity must be attentive to the real world institutional settings in which 
individual selection decisions are made. The institutional focus for this collection is the 
-XGLFLDO$SSRLQWPHQWV&RPPLVVLRQVµ-$&¶. Created under the Constitutional Reform Act 
2005, beginning its work in 2006 and marking its tenth anniversary last year, the JAC is the 
body responsible for recommending candidates for appointment to all courts and tribunals in 
England and Wales (as well as certain tribunals whose jurisdictions extend to Scotland or 
Northern Ireland). The JAC is of course only one part²albeit a very significant part²of the 
new architecture of appointments that plays host to debates about diversity. The statutory 
context, the structure of the legal professions and the behaviour of other stakeholders in the 
judicial system remain key determinants of the rate of progress on recruiting candidates from 
a wider pool of talent that is more reflective of society at large. Inevitably, however, the JAC 
is today the primary focus of many of the most pressing debates about diversity²and, as 
illustrated throughout this collection, views differ on the extent to which its processes and 
policies have helped or hindered the transformation of the judiciary. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
one site of disagreement is between those on the inside of the JAC-managed regime (i.e. the 
JAC, senior judges and officials at the Ministry of Justice) and those on the outside (i.e. 
academics and lawyers, particularly those from groups under-represented in the judiciary). 
Insiders and outsiders often have markedly differing assessments of the scale of the diversity 
deficit, the pace of progress so far and the tools needed to address it, and in particular whether 
the JAC has utilized the levers available to it as fully as it might. They also often have rival 
views on whether the levels of judicial and ministerial involvement in JAC-run selections 
help or hinder the push for a more diverse bench. In short, insiders and outsiders appear to 
have different experiences of and expectations for the JAC¶V selection regime. Across the last 
ten years, constructive debate has proved very challenging because views diverge so 
markedly, with insiders and outsiders often seeming to speak past each other. 
 
This collection encompasses both insider and outsider perspectives on the JAC, with many of 
the contributors using their essays not only to reflect on the many challenges that the JAC has 
confronted during its first decade, but also to chart how it can tackle the challenges that are 
likely to define the next ten years. In addition to a dozen chapters written by academics, this 
FROOHFWLRQLQFOXGHVVL[µUHIOHFWLRQHVVD\V¶E\SHRSOHZLWKSUDFWLFDOILUVWKDQGH[SHULHQFHRIWKH
judicial appointment processes in England and Wales. The authors of these experiential 
essays have all been involved in judicial appointments in one guise or another. They include 
former and current commissioners on the JAC (Frances Kirkham and Noel Lloyd 
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respectively), two former senior civil servants (Sir Thomas Legg and Jenny Rowe), and two 
prominent practitioners who have been vocal critics of the rate of progress on diversifying the 
judiciary (Karon Monaghan QC and Cordella Bart-Stewart). Between them, these DXWKRUV¶
involvement with judicial appointments dates from the early 1980s to today. The collection 
also contains an opening essay UHIOHFWLQJRQWKH-$&¶VILUVWten years by its recently retired 
chair, Christopher Stephens. It closes with a longer essay by Lady Hale on the process for 
selecting the Justices of the UK Supreme Court. Lady Hale is, of course, QRWRQO\WKH&RXUW¶V
Deputy President, but also one of the most powerful voices in the common law world on the 
importance of judicial diversity.  
 
The cROOHFWLRQ¶VREMHFWLYHVDUHthreefold. First, it aims to illustrate the range of views on and 
experiences of the JAC-run regime, which is after all more inclusive than the pre-2005 regime, 
involving as it does ministers, judges, civil servants, lawyers and lay people. Second, it 
attempts to identify possible reasons for, and suggestions on how to respond to, the 
contrasting assessments of those on the inside and outside of the regime, especially as those 
assessments relate to the rate of progress on diversity. Third, the collection attempts to 
reframe in novel and fruitful ways some of the familiar debates that have led to an impasse 
between insiders and outsiders: debates relating to, among other things, µPHULW¶TXRWDVDQG
the respective roles of judges and politicians in the selection process. In doing all of this, the 
FROOHFWLRQIXUQLVKHVDQXPEHURIFRPSHWLQJDVVHVVPHQWVRIWKH-$&¶VILUVWGHFDGHDVZHOODV
mapping out alternative paths that the JAC could pursue in its second. In this Introduction, we 
RIIHUDQRXWVLGHU¶VDFFRXQWRIWKH-$&¶VILUVWGHFDGHDOEHLWRQHWKDWGUDZVRQLQWHUYLHZVDQG
conversations with insiders. Our goal is to give readers a flavour of the highs and lows and 
XSVDQGGRZQVRIWKH-$&¶VILUVWWHQ\HDUVDQGWRVNHWFKVRPHRIWhe main challenges that will 
confront it in its second decade. 
 
The New Institutional Terrain of Judicial Appointments 
 
The terrains on which diversity debates play out have changed. In line with the international 
trend, there are now central roles across the UK for independent commissions in the 
appointment of judges to courts and tribunals.4 Just as there are multiple domestic judiciaries 
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 In 81% of Commonwealth jurisdictions there is now a judicial appointments body that plays some 
role in the selection or short-listing of candidates for appointment to the judiciary: generally J. van Zyl 
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in the UK, so there are also a number of selection processes, each anchored around its own 
commission.5 The Judicial Appointments Board for Scotland µ-$%6¶was created in 2002; 
the Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Commission µ1-,$&¶ in 2005, whilst the JAC 
was established in 2006.6 (This collection includes contributions from former lay 
commissioners at JABS and NIJAC: Alan Paterson and John Morison respectively). The 
Supreme Court, itself a recent creation which only began its work in 2009, has its own 
recruitment process involving ad hoc commissions that are specifically constituted whenever 
vacancies arise.7 But the changing institutional landscape extends much further than this. In 
England and Wales, for example, there has been continuing change over the last decade to the 
roles and responsibilities of several crucial actors in the selection regime such as the Lord 
Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice. Transferring staff and functions from the Ministry of 
Justice to the JAC and the Judicial Office (which was created in 2005 to support senior 
judicial leaders in England and Wales) has also moulded relations between crucial 
stakeholders in the selection regime. Other new bodies are charged with important 
coordinating functions, including the Judicial Diversity Forum, the Judicial Diversity 
7DVNIRUFHDQGWKH-XGLFLDO'LYHUVLW\&RPPLWWHHRIWKH-XGJHV¶&RXQFLOThe UK Parliament 
also takes a greater interest in the appointments regime.8 This changed terrain inevitably 
influences the tenor and direction of debates about diversity, although as shall become evident 
across this collection the new selection regime in England and Wales is marked by continuity 
as well as change (for example, the continued dominance of a traditional understanding of 
µPHULW¶.  
                                                                                                                                                              
Judges in an Age of Judicial Power: Critical Perspectives from Around the World, Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2006, pp. 3, 6-7. 
5
 We do not discuss the process for selecting UK judges that sit on the Court of Justice of the European 
Union or the European Court of Human Rights or any other international courts. For useful recent 
treatments, see M. Bobek, 6HOHFWLQJ(XURSH¶V-XGJHV$&ULWLFDO5HYLHZRIWKH$SSRLQWPHQW
Procedures to the European Courts, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015; and R. Mackenzie, K. 
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Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 159-193 and 239-249. 
7
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The JAC has a heavy workload, overseeing the recruitment of between 300 and 800 judges 
each year. The exact number of vacancies varies from year to year, depending on the number 
and type of competitions that the JAC is requested to run. (See Appendix I for a breakdown of 
the number of recommendations that the JAC has made over its first decade). Partly because 
of this large and variable workload, it has a relatively large membership by international 
standards, with 15 members: seven hold judicial office, one of whom is a magistrate, two 
lawyers, and six lay people, one of whom serves as WKH-$&¶VFKDLU. More information on the 
identity of the commissioners is set out in Appendix II. In contrast to the informality and 
secrecy that for a long time characterized the selection regime run by the Lord Chancellor, the 
JAC runs a much more formal and relatively inclusive regime. Its recommendations for 
judicial office are made following open competition, with the process of evaluating DSHUVRQ¶V
suitability for judicial office requiring the input of multiple actors at several different stages. 
The JAC is under a statutory duty to VHOHFWFDQGLGDWHVµVROHO\RQPHULW¶9 but where two or 
more are assessed to be of equal merit then it can recommend a candidate on the basis of 
improving diversity on the bench.10 We explain the selection processes overseen by the JAC 
in more detail in Appendix III, including the slightly different process for senior appointments, 
but for now it suffices to offer a brief summary of a typical selection exercise run by the JAC. 
 
At the outset of a selection exercise the Lord Chancellor is required to consult with the Lord 
Chief Justice. Supported by their officials, the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice discuss 
the details of the job description. This discussion is informed by advice and data from H.M. 
Courts & Tribunals Service about the judicial vacancy in question. Upon receiving a vacancy 
request from the Lord Chancellor, the JAC runs the process (advertising the post; compiling a 
short-list; running a selection day at which the short-listed candidates will be interviewed and 
may also be required to participate in role-play activities; and then recommending a single 
candidate for each vacancy). Despite its name, the JAC was created as a recommending body, 
not an appointing body. It makes initial recommendations for judicial office, with the final 
say whether or not to appoint lying with, depending on the exact vacancy in question, the 
Lord Chancellor (for the High Court and above), the Lord Chief Justice (for all lower level 
courts) or the Senior President of Tribunals (for most tribunal vacancies). Before 2014, the 
JAC made all of its recommendations to the Lord Chancellor. However, the Lord 
&KDQFHOORU¶s role was diluted by the Crime and Courts Act 2013, which transferred the final 
say over appointments to the lower courts to the Lord Chief Justice and over most tribunal 
                                                        
9
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appointments to the Senior President of Tribunals.11 As a result, the Lord Chancellor has the 
final say over only 3 per cent of all selections. Between 2006 and 2016, there were only six 
occasions out of nearly 5,000 appointments where the final appointing authority did not 
accept WKH-$&¶VUHFRPPHQGHGFDQGLGDWH. In other words, WKH-$&¶V recommendations were 
accepted 99.9 per cent of the time. What this means is that although created as a 
recommending body, the JAC effectively functions as an appointing body.  
 
Even though the terrain of judicial appointments has been reshaped since 2005, there has been 
significantly less change in the composition of the judiciary itself, especially at the highest 
echelons of the courts in England and Wales. It is true that there has been progress in the 
lower courts and the tribunals. For example, more than half of both court judges (51 per cent) 
and tribunal judges (64 per cent) under the age of 40 are female,12 with 1800 women 
appointed to judicial office between 2006 and 2016.13 Particular progress has been made in 
the two crucial entry-level positions to the judiciary; namely, Recorder and Deputy District 
Judges. For example, there has been an increase over the last decade in the proportion of 
female Deputy District Judges from 25 per cent to 37 per cent. It is also true that some 
progress has been seen in higher courts. From 2005, the number of women judges in the High 
Court and the Court of Appeal rose from 10 to 22 and from two to eight respectively.14 This is 
indeed progress²but the numbers are still exceptionally small, representing only 21 per cent 
and 19 per cent of the total number of judges sitting on those courts, with no women at the 
time of writing occupying any of the five most senior leadership roles in the English and 
Welsh judiciary.  
 
7KHVWDWLVWLFVIRU%ULWLVK%ODFN$VLDQDQGPLQRULW\HWKQLFµ%$0(¶judges tell an even 
more dispiriting story. The numbers of BAME candidates applying for and being selected for 
judicial office is greater than when the JAC was created, with 400 BAME judges appointed 
since 2006. But BAME judges still represent a very small minority in the judiciary. Of the 
approximately 3200 professional judges in England and Wales, ethnicity information is 
known for 84 per cent, with 174 (6 per cent) declaring their background as BAME.15 The 
numbers are slightly higher in the tribunals where 10 per cent of judges declared their 
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 Crime and Courts Act 2013, Schedule 13. 
12
 Judicial Diversity Statistics 2016: Judicial Office Statistics Bulletin (Published 28 July 2016. 
Revised 2 December 2016) p. 5. 
13
 Letter dated 7 April 2016 from Christopher Stephens (Chair of the JAC) to the Lord Chancellor. 
14
 Judicial Diversity Statistics 2016: Judicial Office Statistics Bulletin (Published 28 July 2016. 
Revised 2 December 2016) pp. 6-7. 
15
 ibid, pp. 8-9. 
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background as BAME, with this rising to 16 per cent for under-40s. At the time of writing, 
however, there are still no BAME judges in the Court of Appeal, and only two on the High 
Court. For many selection rounds, the proportion of applicants from BAME is equal to or 
greater than the eligible pool, yet the proportion of applicants recommended for appointment 
is often substantially lower. A similar story is seen in terms of professional background: 
around a third of court judges (34 per cent) and two-thirds of tribunal judges (65 per cent) 
have been appointed from non-barrister backgrounds, but there is only one solicitor out of 
105 judges sitting on the High Court, and none on the Court of Appeal.16 The 
unrepresentative bar, in other words, still retains a disproportionate presence at all levels of 
the court judiciary, especially the top courts. In practice, this consolidates the stranglehold 
that white, middle and upper class men enjoy on judicial office. Other more diverse pools of 
talent²such as solicitors, government lawyers, legal executives and academics²are still not 
successfully progressing through the new selection processes in sufficient numbers.  
 
Although the JAC (through its Chair or his or her nominee) plays only a limited role as one of 
five members of the UK Supreme Court ad hoc appointment commissions, it is important to 
note that progress over the last decade LQFKDQJLQJWKHFRPSRVLWLRQRIWKH8.¶VDSH[FRXUW
has been positively glacial, if indeed it is even apt to talk of any progress at all. Every one of 
the thirteen appointments over the last decade has been a white man, and all but one has spent 
the majority of his career at the Bar, prior to appointment as a judge. Even the somewhat 
contentious expansion of the pool of potential appointees beyond the Court of Appeal, which 
enabled direct appointments to the Court, could do nothing to stem the tide. At the time of 
writing, it has been used once: to appoint another white, male barrister. A number of 
appointments will be made to the Supreme Court in the next couple of years, and it might be 
WKDWWKH8.¶VWRSFRXUWORRNVPRUHGLYHUVHWKDQLWGRHVDWWKHWLPHRIZULWLQJ7KLVZRXOGRI
course be welcome, but diversity will remain a real and enduring challenge at all levels of the 
judiciary even if there is what seems like a sudden splurge of more diverse appointments to a 
Supreme Court that is currently staffed by only one women. Indeed, there is also the real risk 
WKDWYHU\YLVLEOHSURJUHVVLQWKH8.¶VWop court will conceal the continued dispiriting lack of 
progress in other parts of the senior judiciary.  
 
Ten years on, then, some limited progress on diversity has been made, but this greater 
diversity has not been evenly distributed across the judiciary as a whole. The rate of progress 
has also been much slower than many had expected, with England and Wales still lagging 
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very far behind comparable countries in terms of judicial composition.17 No doubt a complex 
mix of related reasons accounts for this. A major impediment to faster progress is the 
continued stratification of the legal profession, with the upper echelons of legal practice not 
reflecting the growing diversity found at the early stages of a legal career or in the branches 
of legal practice traditionally regarded as less prestigious than the bar. Another impediment is 
the fact that judicial careers have traditionally lacked flexibility, especially in terms of part-
time posts18 and the general expectation that High Court judges who are generally based in 
London will JRµRQFLUFXLW¶LHWRVLWRQFRXUWVRXWVLGHRI/RQGRQRIWHQIRr many weeks at a 
time).  
 
But what of the JAC itself? Whilst recognizing the importance of these impediments, and 
whilst acknowledging that the statutory framework confers only limited tools to promote 
diversity on it, some commentators argue that the JAC¶VWLPLGLW\is part of the explanation for 
why there has not been faster progress over the last ten years. TKH-$&¶VµSDVVLYLW\¶19, it is 
often argued, is seen in inter alia: its failure to displace traditional understandings of µmerit¶ 
its reluctance to downgrade the importance attached within the selection process to judicial 
references and statutorily required consultations with senior judges; and its failure to resist 
selection criteria that can disadvantage candidates from non-traditional backgrounds (for 
example, the requirement to have µIHH-SDLG¶ experience in a part-time judicial position whilst 
continuing in a day job, which might not be practicable for some types of legal practice such 
as solicitors in city firms or high-street practices). There can be little doubt that the -$&¶V
timidity is related to and partly a consequence of its difficult and sometimes tumultuous 
relations with other stakeholders in the judicial system, and the senior judiciary and the 
Ministry of Justice in particular. Or to put this mRUHEOXQWO\WKH-$&¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRagitate 
for faster progress on diversity (or for that matter to make full and effective use of the tools 
available to it under the statutory scheme) has been limited by the need at various points 
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 See e.g. Council of Europe, European Judicial Systems. Efficiency and Quality of Justice: CEPEJ 
Studies No 23 (2016) 101, where the UK ranks alongside Armenia and Azerbaijan at the very bottom 
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roles. 
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 This is changing. The Crime and Courts Act 2013 amended the Senior Courts Act 1981 to allow the 
maximum number of judges in the High Court and the Court of Appeal to be comprised of a specified 
number of full-term equivalents (i.e. a mix of full-time and part-time positions) rather than a maximum 
number of individual judges. There are also similar provisions applicable in respect of the Supreme 
Court. 
19
 6HH/%DUPHVDQG.0DOOHVRQµ7KH/HJDO3URIHVVLRQDV*DWHNHHSHUWRWKH-XGLFLDU\'HVLJQ)DXOWV
in MHDVXUHVWR(QKDQFH'LYHUVLW\¶Modern Law Review 74, 2011, pp. 245, 258-261. 
**HHDQG(5DFNOH\¶Introduction'LYHUVLW\DQGWKH-$&·V)LUVW7HQ<HDUV·LQ G. Gee and E. Rackley (eds), Debating Judicial Appointments in 
an Age of Diversity (Routledge, 2017) 
 10 
during its first ten years to placate its stakeholders in order to safeguard its position on the 
constitutional map. 
 
7KH-$&¶V)LUVW'HFDGHSecuring An Institutional Foothold 
 
Over ten years on from its creation, the JAC today occupies what most regard as a secure 
place on the constitutional map.20 The new model of appointments overseen by the JAC 
attracts µEURDGFRQVHQVXV¶, with few proposing significant departures from it.21 However, this 
belies the number and scale of challenges that the JAC confronted during what at times was a 
tumultuous first decade. Much of this tumult resulted from rocky relationships between the 
JAC and its stakeholders (the judiciary, the legal professions and the Ministry of Justice), 
ZLWKWKH-$&¶V future seeming to be uncertain at various points during the ten years as a result. 
In brief: although the JAC now enjoys a secure position on the institutional landscape, the 
history of its first decade illustrates that it occupies an extremely narrow constitutional space, 
with its ability to drive policy change limited by, amongst other things, the need to nurture the 
confidence of multiple stakeholders whose interests do not always coincide. This is a useful 
reminder that, in the real world, debates about diversity do not occur in the abstract, but can 
be buffeted by the competing interests, priorities and personalities of the various stakeholders 
in the judicial system. For these purposes, it is possible to divide the -$&¶VILUVWdecade into 
three phases: an initial period between 2006 and 2010 defined by tensions and even hostility 
between the JAC and its main stakeholders; a period of stabilization and further change from 
2011 to 2014; and finally, some evidence of renewed tensions with the judiciary between 
2014 and 2016. A golden thread that runs throughout the decade is the way in which 
opposition from stakeholders crimps WKH-$&¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRLQQRYDWHLQEROGDQGQRYHO
ways.  
 
Tensions and Hostility (2006-2010) 
 
From the very beginning of its work in 2006, the JAC faced a number of serious financial, 
staffing and workload challenges.22 The financial challenge took the form of a 5 per cent 
                                                        
20
 It is overstating matters, however, to suggest, as the Ministry of Justice did in 2015, that the JAC is 
³DXQLYHUVDOO\UHVSHFWHGSDUWRIWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOODQGVFDSH´0LQLVWU\Rf Justice, Triennial Review: 
Judicial Appointments Commission London: Ministry of Justice, 2015, p. 3. 
21
 House of Lords, Select Committee on the Constitution, Judicial Appointments, 25th Report of 
Session 2010-12, (HL 272), para 5. 
22
 See Gee et al, The Politics of Judicial Independence, pp. 166-167. 
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budget cut in its first year. That most of its staff was seconded from the Department of 
Constitutional Affairs (i.e. the predecessor ministerial department to the Ministry of Justice) 
led not only to some officials struggling to adapt to the new way of selecting judges, but also 
to a perception among some outsiders that the JAC was not independent from, but rather an 
adjunct of, the government.23 The workload challenges included a lack of reliable forecasting 
data from the Courts Service about the number of likely vacancies to arise in any one year. 
All of this occurred at the same time as the JAC was devising its own processes for 
identifying well-qualified candidates as well as managing a number of selection rounds 
underway under the pre-2006 processes and which were inherited from the Department of 
Constitutional Affairs.  
 
TKLVWUDQVODWHGLQWRWKH-$&¶VHDUO\\HDUVbeing marked by criticism, suspicion and hostility, 
as powerfully recounted in the essay in this collection by Frances Kirkham (who served as a 
judicial commissioner on the JAC from 2006-2011). Many in the legal profession criticized 
the JAC for the length of time it took for judicial vacancies to be filled under the new 
selection regime. However, most of this criticism was misplaced insofar as delays mainly 
resulted from the time that it took the Ministry to finalize its vacancy request at the outset of 
the process (a step that was required before the JAC could initiate a selection exercise) and 
then tRDFFHSWWKH-$&¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQDWWKHSURFHVV¶Vend. Many judges and barristers 
DOVRFULWLFL]HGWKH-$&¶VUHOLDQFHRQDSSOLFDWLRQIRUPVqualifying tests, interviews and 
evidence-based evaluations that relate to explicitly stated criteria for appointment. Typical 
were complaints that several barristers widely viewed as high-flyers had not been successful 
in securing an appointment under the new processes even though they would almost certainly 
have done so under the pre-2006 processes. This period was also characterized by tensions 
between the JAC and the Ministry of Justice, with ministers and officials left frustrated that 
the government was formally responsible for the new appointments regime yet lacked 
effective levers to influence its day-to-day workings.24 Jack Straw, the Lord Chancellor from 
2007-2010, was frustrated by both the slow progress on diversity as well as his limited input 
into senior appointments.25 In brief: whilst the JAC stressed its role as an independent body 
                                                        
23
 %DURQHVV3UDVKDUµ7UDQVODWLQJ$VSLUDWLRQVLQWR5HDOLW\(VWDEOLVKLQJWKH-XGLFLDO$SSRLQWPHQWV
&RPPLVVLRQ¶LQ-XGLFLDO$SSRLQWPHQWV&RPPLVVLRQJudicial Appointments: Balancing Independence, 
Accountability and Legitimacy, London: Judicial Appointments Commission, 2010, p. 47. 
24
 7KLVVHFWLRQGUDZVRQWKHDFFRXQWRIWKH-$&¶VHDUO\\HDUVLQ*HHHWDOThe Politics of Judicial 
Independence, pp. 164-170. 
25
 See J. Straw, $VSHFWVRI/DZ5HIRUP$Q,QVLGHU¶VPerspective, Cambridge: Cambrige University 
Press, 2013, pp. 58-59. 
**HHDQG(5DFNOH\¶Introduction'LYHUVLW\DQGWKH-$&·V)LUVW7HQ<HDUV·LQ G. Gee and E. Rackley (eds), Debating Judicial Appointments in 
an Age of Diversity (Routledge, 2017) 
 12 
performing an important constitutional task in identifying candidates for judicial office, the 
Ministry regarded the JAC as insufficiently responsive to the concerns of judges and lawyers.  
 
One measure of the level of unease is that the Ministry undertook two reviews of the JAC 
within the first two years of its birth, with a total of seven reviews of one sort or another 
between 2006 and 2012. Relations deteriorated to such an extent around 2009-2010 that the 
Ministry mulled the possibility of abolishing the JAC and either bringing judicial 
appointments back in-house or delegating the responsibility for appointments to the senior 
judges, although neither option ZDVSXUVXHGZLWKVHULRXVQHVV7KLVZDVWKH-$&¶VILUVWµQHDU
GHDWKH[SHULHQFH¶ (as it came to be known inside the JAC), with a second to follow in 2010 
when the JAC was included in Schedule 7 of the Public Bodies Bill, which sought to 
empower ministers to abolish or restructure a wide range of non-departmental public bodies. 
The bodies listed in Schedule 7 would not inevitably be scrapped or restructured but would 
have remained subject to the risk that ministers could use their delegated powers to purge 
them at some point in the future. This was the Cabinet Office¶V Bill, and the JAC was 
included in it against WKH0LQLVWU\¶VDGYLFHWKDWWKLVZRXOGOHDGWRsubstantial resistance from 
the judiciary and the legal professions. 7KH0LQLVWU\¶VSUHGLFWLRQZDVDFFXUDWHZLWKMXGJHV
and lawyers setting aside their misgivings about the new appointment processes to defend the 
JAC, with their efforts successful in securing the JAC¶V removal from the Bill. According to 
some insiders, these near death experiences helped to cement much more constructive 
relationships between the JAC, senior judges and the legal profession. 
 
Stability and Change (2011-2014) 
 
In one sense, the JAC survived these near death experiences. In another sense, what emerged 
IURPWKHVHVHULHVRIEUXLVLQJHQFRXQWHUVZLWKWKH0LQLVWU\ZDVLQHIIHFWDµQHZ¶-$&7KHUH
were significant staff changes throughout the JAC. By 2011, Christopher Stephens and Nigel 
Reeder had been appointed as the new Chair and Chief Executive, replacing Baroness Prashar 
and Claire Pelham respectively. By 2012, the JAC was staffed by a new cohort of 
commissioners. This was no accident; it was a state of affairs that the Ministry engineered by 
extending some of the inaugurDOFRPPLVVLRQHUV¶WHUPVE\MXVWDVLQJOH\HDUWRHQVXUHWKDW
most of their terms in office would conclude by early 2012. Budget cuts of 18 per cent 
introduced in the new age of austerity between 2006 and 2013 led to reductions LQWKH-$&¶V
personnel from 109 to 79 over the same period. Accompanying all of this was WKH-$&¶V
renewed effort to be more responsive to the business needs of the judicial system. It is only a 
slight exaggeration to say that by 2011 the JAC²with its new leadership, a new cohort of 
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commissioners and a streamlined internal organization²was willing to embrace a new vision 
of its own role. 
 
Some of the tensions in the earlier period had derived IURPFRPSHWLQJYLVLRQVRIWKH-$&¶V
role,QWKHIDFHRIVXVSLFLRQDQGKRVWLOLW\IURPMXGJHVDQGODZ\HUVWKH-$&¶VLQLWLDO
leadership sought to secure its place on the institutional map by stressing both its 
independence and the importance of its role in identifying suitably qualified candidates for 
judicial office. ,QLWVHDUO\\HDUVWKH-$&¶VILUVWOHDGHUVKLSWHDPwas particularly concerned to 
protect the boundaries of its role from interference by judges, ministers or civil servants. On 
WKLVµFRQVWLWXWLRQDO¶YLVLRQWKH-$&was a proactive actor playing a central role in directing 
policy on appointments and diversity. One concrete example of this can be seen in the 
ZLOOLQJQHVVRIWKH-$&¶VLQLWLDOFRPPLVVLRQHUVWRchallenge the use of fee paid experience as 
an additional criterion for appointment. The JAC objected to this criterion on the grounds that 
it would tend to disadvantage candidates from non-traditional backgrounds. It took this stand 
even though both the judiciary and the Ministry felt that those appointed to the bench should 
have some prior experience of fee-paid judicial office in order that newly appointed judges 
FRXOGµKLWWKHJURXQGUXQQLQJ¶. This was one of a number of issues in respect of which there 
were intense clashes between the JAC on the one hand and the Ministry and the judges on the 
other.  
 
In contrast WRDµFRQVWLWXWLRQDO¶YLVLRQRIWKH-$&¶VUROH, the Ministry embraced DµUHFUXLWPHQW¶
vision. This envisaged the JAC serving as a recruitment agency whose chief responsibility 
was to respond to the business needs and workforce requirements of the judiciary, as 
determined by senior judges and the Ministry. By 2011, with new leadership at its helm, the 
JAC was more sympathetic to thH0LQLVWU\¶Vrecruitment vision. The new leadership team 
reshaped the JAC into a leaner, cheaper and more responsive outfit. As Christopher Stephens 
explains LQWKLVFROOHFWLRQWKH-$&¶V leadership oversaw a change agenda that included: 
cutting WKH-$&¶Vcosts; reducing the length of the end-to-end selection process from up to 40 
weeks to an average of less than 20 weeks; improving VDWLVIDFWLRQOHYHOVZLWKWKH-$&¶V
processes amongst those who applied for judicial office; and better supporting the business 
needs of the justice system. Emblematic was the fact that, in its more responsive mode, the 
JAC largely abandoned its policy of resisting fee paid experience as an additional eligibility 
criterion, accepting instead the argument that business needs required that those appointed to 
µhit the ground running¶. The JAC did so even though a practical effect of this was to 
narrow²and in all likelihood also render less diverse²the pool of potential candidates who 
would meet this additional criterion. On one reading, then, the JAC prioritized the need to 
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stabilize relations with the senior judiciary and the Ministry over the need to aggressively 
promote judicial diversity.  
 
By subscribing to the 0LQLVWU\¶VµUHFUXLWPHQW¶YLVLRQ of its own role, the JAC repaired 
relations with its primary stakeholders and stabilized its foothold on the institutional map. 
More generally, this period was one of both stability and change. Important changes were 
made to the statutory framework. The Crime and Courts Act 2013 further diluted the 
involvement of the Lord Chancellor in individual selections by passing the final decision 
whether or not to appoint the candidates recommended by the JAC to the Lord Chief Justice 
(for all court vacancies below the High Court) or the Senior President of Tribunals (for most 
tribunal vacancies). What bears emphasis is how during this period stability and change were 
interrelated. Stability flowed in large part from change: as the JAC adopted a more 
conciliatory approach to its stakeholders by becoming much more responsive to the business 
needs of the justice system, so its institutional position stabilized. Change in turn flowed from 
this new found stability: with the confidence of its main stakeholders on the rise, and its 
institutional position secured, the JAC¶VQHZleadership team won notable victories that had 
eluded its inaugural leadership. These included the introduction of advertisements, application 
forms, short-listing and interviews for appointments to the Court of Appeal and leadership 
positions such as Heads of Division.26 Another H[DPSOHZDVWKHH[WHQVLRQRIWKH-$&¶VUHPLW
to include the role of Deputy High Court Judges, a fee-paid position that is widely seen as a 
stepping-stone to a full-time appointment to the High Court.27 These fee-paid positions had 
originally been excluded from the -$&¶V regime. That filling these positions had been 
regarded instead as deployment GHFLVLRQVZLWKLQWKH/RUG&KLHI-XVWLFH¶Vdiscretion²with an 
accompanying lack of transparency and formality, and with no publicly available data by 
which to measure diversity²had EHHQDµUXQQLQJVRUH¶GXULQJWKH-$&¶VHDUO\\HDUV.28 But it 
was only when its own place on the institutional map had been stabilized that the JAC was 
able to persuade the Ministry and judiciary that its remit should embrace appointing Deputy 
High Court judges.  
 
Renewed Tensions with the Senior Judiciary (2014-2016) 
 
By 2014, critics were already characterizing the JAC as an excessively cautious body that so 
far as possible would avoid innovating in ways that would unsettle its critical stakeholders. 
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 Gee et al, The Politics of Judicial Independence,  p. 184. 
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 See Judicial Appointments Commission Regulations 2013. 
28
 See House of Lords, Select Committee on the Constitution, Judicial Appointments, para 166. 
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The publication in 2014 of its SROLF\RQWKHµHTXDOPHULWSURYLVLRQ¶ confirms this 
characterization.29 The Crime and Courts Act clarified that the requirement for the JAC to 
UHFRPPHQGFDQGLGDWHVµVROHO\RQPHULW¶DVprovided under s63 of the Constitutional Reform 
Act 2005) did not prevent it preferring a candidate on diversity grounds where two or more 
candidates were RIµHTXDOPHULW¶30 Views differed on whether this new provision would 
translate into more diverse appointments. Some doubted whether there are really many 
occasions where two or more candidates can be deemed to be equal; WKH-$&¶VWKHQchair 
Christopher Stephens had suggested in 2011 that there had been no two indistinguishable 
candidates out of the nearly 500 recommendations made by the JAC since he had assumed 
office earlier that year.31 Others involved in the appointments process²QRWDEO\WKH-$&¶V
former Vice Chair, Lady Justice Hallett²had opposing views, suggesting WKDWLWZDVµQRWDV
UDUHDVSHRSOHWKLQNWKDW\RXKDYHFDQGLGDWHVZKRDUHHTXDOO\TXDOLILHG¶32 Either way, the 
statutory change created space for the JAC to devise its own policy on how to implement the 
µHTXDOPHULW¶SURYLVLRQ  
 
In designing the policy the JAC had two questions to address. First, should the equal merit 
provision apply at multiple stages of the selection process (including short-listing) or only at 
the final stage when the JAC makes a recommendation? Second, to which groups of people 
should the provision apply? That the JAC answered both questions in a very narrow, 
minimalist fashion is in keeping with its cautious approach to policy innovation. The JAC 
initially decided that the provision would only apply at the final stage of recommendation, 
and not at short-listing. This minimalist approach was short-sighted, to say the least. The 
premise that there can be candidates exhibiting different combinations of strengths and 
weaknesses who are determined to be of equal merit is as relevant to short-listing as final 
recommendation. Applying the provision at short-listing could conceivably help counteract 
deep-seated barriers that prevent candidates from being invited to an interview.  
 
In answering the second question, the JAC further resolved that the provision would only 
apply to race and gender on the grounds that the provision should only be used where under-
representation can be substantiated by reference to published data. Gathering reliable data for 
groups other than race and gender can indeed be problematic, but some suggest that the JAC 
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 Judicial Appointments Commission, Equal Merit Provision Policy (April 2014). 
30
 Crime and Courts Act 2013, Schedule 13. This provision derives from s159 of the Equality Act 2010. 
31
 House of Lords, Select Committee on the Constitution, Judicial Appointments: Oral and Written 
Evidence 25th Report of Session 2010-12, (HL 272) Q.364. 
32
 ibid, Q.240. 
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needs to devote more of its time and resources to become a pioneer on such matters.33 That in 
2015-2016 the provision was only invoked in a mere 14 out of 308 recommendations is 
VFDUFHO\VXUSULVLQJJLYHQWKHQDUURZQHVVRIWKH-$&¶VSROLF\34 There thus a very real risk that 
WKH-$&¶VSROLF\ZLOOFRPHWREHGLVPLVVHGDVµPHUHO\DQRWKHUSRVLWLYHKHDGOLQHEDFNHGE\
YHU\OLWWOHSRVLWLYHLPSDFWLQWHUPVRIDGGUHVVLQJWKHJODULQJGLYHUVLW\GHILFLW¶35 The 
cautiousness of the -$&¶Vpolicy ZDVDUHVSRQVHWRWKHMXGLFLDU\¶V concerns. Over half of the 
responses tRWKH-$&¶VFRQVXOWDWLRQRQhow to implement the equal merit provision were from 
judges and their representative bodies. There were also detailed negotiations in private 
between the JAC, the Ministry and the judges. Suggestions of the strength of judicial 
FRQFHUQVZHUHDSSDUHQWZKHQ&KULVWRSKHU6WHSKHQVFRPPHQWHGWKDWµWKHUHLVVHULRXVFDXWLRQ
DPRQJPDQ\¶ZLWKWKH-$&¶VµVWDNHKROGHUV « FDXWLRXVDERXWWKHHTXDOPHULWSURYLVLRQ¶36 
+HQRWHGWKDWWKHUHDFWLRQIURPWKHMXGJHVDQGODZ\HUVZDVµPL[HG¶$XJPHQWLQJ this picture 
of a body that is hemmed in by its main stakeholders is the fact that the JAC sought to revisit 
its policy shortly after its introduction. An internal report prepared in 2016 had recommended 
that the JAC should extend the provision to short-listing.37 This proposal triggered 
considerable controversy with senior judges. On this occasion, the opposition of some judicial 
members on the JAC ultimately stymied the widening of the equal merit policy. This seems to 
confirm both the degree to which the JAC has to placate its stakeholders and the degree of the 
judicial influence on its internal decision-making. Nevertheless, in January 2017 the JAC 
published a slightly tweaked version of their equal merit policy which explains that whilst the 
provision would not formally be applied at short-listing, the JAC will increase the number of 
candidates who are shortlisted where there are two or more applicants assessed as being of 
equal merit, including some women or BAME applicants.38 Perhaps inevitably, this too seems 
like a fudge, representing neither a full-throated application of the rationale nor the spirit of 
the equal merit provision. And as such it seems unlikely to make much, if any, difference to 
the appointments made. 
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 **HHDQG.0DOOHVRQµ-XGLFLDO$SSRLQWPHQWV'LYHUVLW\DQGWKH(TXDO0HULW3URYLVLRQ¶UK 
Constitutional Law Blog , 6 May 2014. 
34
 Judicial Selection and Recommendations for Appointment Statistics, April 2015 to March 2016. 
35
 A. Paterson and C. Paterson, Guarding the Guardians: Towards an Independent, Accountable and 
Diverse Senior Judiciary, London: CentreForum, 2012 p. 48. 
36
 House of Commons Justice Committee, The Work of the Judicial Appointments Commission (HC 
1132) (5 March 2014) Q.31. 
37
 Judicial Appointments Commission, Minutes (July 2016) para 4.1. 
38
 Judicial Appointments Commission, Equal Merit Provision Policy. First published in 2014 and 
revised in 2017.  
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This HSLVRGHFRLQFLGHGZLWKDQRWKHUFKDQJHLQWKH-$&¶VOHDGHUVKLS,Q&KULVWRSKHU
6WHSKHQV¶VWHUPDVFKDLUHQGHG5HSDLULQJWKH-$&¶VUHODWLRQVZLWKWKHMXGLFLDU\KDGEHHQRQH
of his priorities when first appointed chair five years earlier. After initial success on this front, 
6WHSKHQV¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHVHQLRUMXGLFLDU\proved more challenging towards the end of 
his term. TKH-$&¶VOHDGHUVKLSIRXQGLWGLIILFXOWat times to cultivate a constructive working 
relationship with Lord Thomas, the Lord Chief Justice since 2013. Inside the JAC it was felt 
that the Lord Chief Justice was second-guessing many of its decisions. There was also 
concern that some in the senior judiciary were keen to reverse some of the major elements of 
WKH-$&¶VVHOHFWLRQSURFHVVHVIRUH[DPSOHWKHUHTXLUHPHQWthat all applicants must complete 
a standardized and competence-based application form; the use of interviews). For their part, 
some senior judges felt that the JAC lacked an effective strategy for encouraging judicial 
diversity while others complained that its selection processes made too many onerous 
demands of the senior judiciary (for example, in terms of writing references, providing 
feedback as consultees and sitting on interview panels). These tensions occurred during a 
period of low judicial morale, caused in part by changes to judicial pensions as well as more 
general concerns about the increasing workload pressures placed on individual judges.39 
Many judges believe that the stature of the judiciary has been seriously diminished by 
substantial cuts in real terms to pay and pensions, with this the reason why two recent 
recruitment exercises for the High Court have not filled all of the vacancies. Indeed, working 
out how to promote a positive relationship with the senior judiciary²one that takes account 
of judicial concerns but does not submit unthinkingly to them²is a central challenge for Lord 
Kakkar, who was appointed WKH-$&¶VWKLUGFKDLULQOctober 2016.  
 
7KH-$&¶V1H[W'HFDGHContinuity and Change 
 
Without doubWWKH-$&¶VILUVWGHFDGHKDVEHHQWXPXOWXRXVDWWLPHV6RPHRIthis tumult has 
been of its own making. Some of it has not. Either way, it is important not to lose sight of the 
fact that the idea of a selection process that is organized around an independent 
recommending body is now accepted as an integral part of the judicial system. Despite all of 
the criticism it receives²much of it justified²the JAC is today widely viewed as performing 
a critical role in nurturing the rule of law by overseeing the appointment of qualified 
candidates who are recruited following a fair and open competition. Over the decade, the JAC 
has succeeded in introducing quicker, more efficient and more candidate-focused selection 
processes, and has done so on a smaller budget and with fewer staff. In terms of corporate 
governance, the JAC is a small and inexpensive public body that secures value for money. 
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And with the publication of its annual report and accounts, board minutes and policy papers, 
the JAC is in many respects an exemplar of an open and accountable public body. It is 
certainly the case that the JAC ends its first decade on a stronger institutional and reputational 
footing than when it began its work in 2006, and certainly stronger than at many points during 
its first ten years.  
 
But what of the next ten years? What are the issues, opportunities and challenges facing the 
JAC as it enters its difficult teenage years? For all of its success in establishing itself on the 
institutional landscape, the JAC has had much less success in transforming the judiciary. It 
has rightly been criticized for publishing press releases that cherry-pick statistics that could 
lead casual readers to conclude that greater progress has been made on addressing the 
diversity deficit than is in fact the case.40 2IFRXUVHWKH-$&¶VOLPLWHGHIIHFWLYHQHVVDW
securing greater judicial diversity should be assessed in a wider context that acknowledges 
the systemic issues that impact on diveUVLW\0XFKKDVEHHQPDGHRIWKHIDFWWKDWWKH-$&¶V
ability to drive change is limited by the lack of diversity within the legal profession. However, 
the JAC is also limited by a statutory framework that is not designed to be a full-throated 
endorsement of diversity, but instead serves multiple other goals as well (for example, 
enhancing the independence, legitimacy and transparency of the appointment processes). The 
diversification of the judiciary is, at best, a secondary goal of the statutory framework. Even 
the statutory duty imposed on the JAC is relatively weak, only requiring it to have regard to 
the need to encourage diversity among those who are available for selection.41 The impact of 
the equal merit provision²one of the few diversity-oriented tools conferred by statute on the 
JAC²has been largely stymied by judicial opposition. In all of this lies evidence of the 
µUHJXODWRU\ELQG¶42 that has ensnared the JAC for the last ten years: it has a specific albeit 
weak statutory duty relating to judicial diversity, but very limited scope to influence several 
of the key determinants of success. At the same time, notwithstanding these wider systemic 
factors, the JAC has been too timid. It could²and, over the next decade, should²do more. 
Many of the contributions to this collection offer thoughts on how the JAC should approach 
the next ten years. For our part, we would suggest that there are five main tasks that should 
DQLPDWHWKH-$&¶VVHFRQGGHFDGH 
 
First, the JAC should do more to challenge the judiciary not merely to pay lip-service to 
diversity, but to pursue policies that will lead to faster change in the composition of the bench. 
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While there are some judges who have a long-standing commitment to judicial diversity, for 
many more²including, often, those in leadership positions²this commitment is qualified by 
a deeply-seated reluctance to unsettle traditional understandings of what (or who) makes a 
µJRRG¶MXGJH)RUVXUHWKHMXGLFLDU\KDVLQWURduced a number of welcome initiatives such as a 
Judicial Working Shadowing Scheme (which enables lawyers considering a career in judicial 
office to spend time observing the work of sitting judges) and a Judicial Role Models Scheme 
(where judges from a range of diverse backgrounds assist outreach events and serve as 
mentors).43 What is undeniable, however, is that the judiciary needs to be encouraged²and 
even harried²into doing more. The JAC has an important role to play here. It should, for 
example, challengHPDQ\MXGJHV¶continued attachment to traditional understandings of merit. 
,WVKRXOGUHVLVWWKHMXGLFLDU\¶VLQVLVWHQFHRQIHH-paid experience since this not only favours 
long-serving barristers, but also reinforces that same traditional understanding of merit. And it 
should insist on a bolder equal merit policy that applies at short-listing in the same way as 
well as at the final recommendation, and it should look out for opportunities to use it. 
 
6HFRQGWKH-$&VKRXOGZRUNWRZHDNHQWKHEDU¶VJULSRQDFcess to a judicial career in the 
courts. It should, for example, work with professional associations to ensure that candidates 
from unconventional backgrounds who have the potential to make excellent judges have the 
information and opportunities to develop skills and undergo activities that prepare them for 
judicial office (such as fee-paid experience, training and mentoring).  The JAC should build 
and strengthen relationships with key interest groups VXFKDVWKH:RPHQ-XGJH¶V$VVRFLDWLRQ
the Black Solicitors Network and the Lawyers with Disabilities Division of the Law Society. 
These groups not only have enormous expertise which should help to inform the JAC¶VIXWXUH 
policies and direction, but are also excellently placed to operate as a conduit between the JAC 
and highly-qualified non-traditional candidates. It is also vital that the JAC focus on the 
implementation and outcomes (and not simply the inauguration) of measures designed to put 
pressure on key gatekeepers in the legal profession; for example, by asking questions about 
the action taken to give effect to commitments made by leading Magic Circle and other law 
firms in initiatives to encourage senior staff to apply for judicial appointment.44 The JAC 
should also do more to puncture continuing myths²identified in its own research as well as 
elsewhere²surrounding the appointments process and the judicial role; an example is the 
persistent misconception that a reference from a High Court judge is need to apply 
successfully for lower level judicial vacancies. Many myths are still widely held by under-
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represented groups.45 Here actions speak louder than words. The quickest and most effective 
ZD\WRGHPRQVWUDWHWKH-$&¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRZLGHQLQJWKHDSSRLQWPHQWSRROZRXOGEHD
significant and sustained step-change in the number of appointments made from across all 
branches of the legal profession, including solicitors, academics, lawyers in the public sector, 
lawyers from the employed bar and legal executives.  
 
Third, the JAC should review²and, where necessary, improve²its own internal practices 
and operations. To be fair, the JAC has not been short of internal and external reviews during 
its first decade. It is important, however, that the JAC continues to scrutinize and improve its 
processes and procedures²for example, in relation to the collation of diversity data and the 
operation of its online tests²as well as innovating new ones.46 In particular, there should be 
greater transparency of the short-listing and selection day processes, particularly the role of 
the (non-JAC) lay and judicial panellists in these processes. Reviewing its internal processes 
should not be used, however, as an excuse for senior judges to reverse important progress that 
the JAC has made in the formalization of the selection process, especially in respect of senior 
vacancies. Attention should also be paid to ensuring the effective engagement of all of the 
-$&¶Vcommissioners. At times, some commissioners seem somewhat disengaged from some 
DVSHFWVRIWKH-$&¶VZRUk, especially its ongoing tensions with key stakeholders. For sure, 
the commissioners all have busy and demanding day-jobs, and their remuneration for the 
-$&¶VZRUNLVOLPLWHGWRDURXQGGD\VSHU\HDU,WLVespecially important, however, that the 
-$&¶V leadership team ensures that the newly appointed commissioners²especially but not 
only the lay commissioners²DUHDEOHWRFRQWULEXWHWRWKH-$&¶VZRUNDVVRRQDVSRVVLEOH
following appointment. According to one official at the JAC, it can take up to a year for a lay 
commissioner to find his or her feet in their new role. The JAC must ensure that the risk of 
EHLQJµFDSWXUHG¶E\NH\VWDNHKROGHUVLVKLJKOLJKWHGDVSDUWRIWKH training of new 
commissioners. 
 
)RXUWKWKH-$&VKRXOGWDNHPRUHµRZQHUVKLS¶ of the process for making senior appointments. 
At present, statute specifies the membership of the ad hoc panels that select candidates for 
appointment to the Court of Appeal and senior leadership positions such as Heads of Division 
and the Lord Chief Justice. Strictly speaking, tKHVHSDQHOVRSHUDWHDV³FRPPLWWHHV´RIWKH
JAC, with their membership comprising senior judges as well as commissioners from the JAC. 
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These appointments do not fall under the full auspices of the regular JAC-run regime. The 
precise composition of these panels depends on the senior vacancy in question, but each 
includes senior judges who do not sit on the JAC. There is no clear rationale for having these 
appointments lie outside the usual JAC processes other than to give senior judges greater say 
in the selection of their colleagues. However, as academic critics have argued, senior judges 
have too much influence over the selection of other senior judges.47 Several of the lay 
commissioners who have sat on selection panels for senior posts have expressed concern 
about their ability to challenge the judicial panellists. According to one study, the lay 
commissioners on these panels tend to perform a limited, secondary role of corroborating the 
VHQLRUMXGLFLDOSDQHOLVWV¶DVVHVVPHQW of the candidates.48 If actLQJLQWKLVZD\WKH-$&¶VOD\
commissioners can perform an important role in helping senior judges to understand the 
importance of leadership skills and people management. They can also help to ensure that 
decisions are evidence-based and made in terms of and by reference to the selection criteria. 
What it also means, however, is that there is likely to be limited change in the type of 
candidates who succeed in the competitions for senior posts. It is also likely to mean that 
traditional understandings of merit will continue to prevail. Addressing this would ideally 
involve statutory change to bring top appointments fully within the normal JAC regime, with 
selection panels that are drawn wholly from the JAC¶VFRKRUWRIFRPPLVVLRQHrs. The JAC 
should push for this statutory change. However, short of statutory change, the JAC should 
take greater responsibility for these selections. At present, it is commonplace to hear 
commissioners and staff at the JAC talk about selections above the High Court as not ³one of 
RXUV´7KLVUHYHDOVDmindset in which the JAC self-identifies as a secondary actor in top 
appointments, with the senior judges who participate on the ad hoc panels having the decisive 
say. This is concerning since some who are closely involved in the JAC concede that there are 
still ³who is next in line"´ DQG³ZKRVHWXUQLVLW"´attitudes amongst senior judges when it 
comes to deciding appointments to the Courts of Appeal and leadership roles.  
 
Finally, and implicit in the four preceding points, the JAC must provide much stronger and 
more forceful leadership on diversity. It should provide active and strategic leadership on the 
need for, and design of, the fundamental and far-reaching changes to the selection process. 
But its leadership should extend more broadly to include judicial working conditions, training, 
mentoring and appraisal. The JAC should be forward-thinking in its interpretation of policies 
and changes already introduced (for example, around the availability and publication of part-
time and flexible working-arrangements). And it should be provocative in its support and 
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lobbying for new ones (including changes to historical relics, such as the requirement to go 
out on circuit, and²where these unnecessarily limit the applicant pool²statutory and non-
statutory minimum qualifications for judicial appointments). Indeed, in relation to the latter, 
the JAC is uniquely placed to offer evidence-based arguments for change. The JAC should 
also encourage the judiciary and the Ministry to provide more resources to the cash-strapped 
Judicial College so that more extensive training and mentoring can be made available for 
newly appointed judges. To do this requires the JAC to demonstrate clear and deliberate 
leadership. At various points during the last decade the JAC has seemed to lack the nerve for 
proactive leadership.  
 
The recent Ministry of Justice consultation on Modernising Judicial Terms and Conditions in 
late 2016 is arguably a case in point.49 As part of a package of measures aimed at improving 
diversity, the Government proposed single non-renewable terms for fee-paid judicial posts. 
The Government argued that this would allow for a larger and more diverse cohort of 
candidates to obtain fee-paid experience prior to applying for a salaried judicial role. This is 
not a trivial concern: as noted earlier, rightly or wrongly, considerable weight is placed on 
fee-paid judicial experience as an eligibility criterion for appointment to a salaried judicial 
position, and often this requirement can disadvantage non-traditional candidates. Driving the 
*RYHUQPHQW¶VSURSRVDOZDVWKHKRSHWKDWa wider cohort of candidates with fee-paid 
experience might in turn lead to a more diverse salaried judiciary. Admittedly, views differed 
on the proposal. Those in favour welcomed the opportunity to widen the pool of candidates 
for judicial office who had fee-paid experience, with the hope that over time this would 
disturb settled expectations about the type of lawyers who are appointed to fee-paid positions.  
However, many fee-SDLGMXGJHVDQGODZ\HUV¶DVVRFLDWLRQVZHUHRSSRVHG, citing training and 
workload concerns relating to the time that fee-paid judges need to acquire experience. Their 
worry was that many fee-paid judges would not have sufficient opportunity before their non-
renewable term lapsed to develop relevant experience in certain types of case (for example, 
serious sex offences). Some also contendHGWKDWWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VSURSRVDOPLJKWactually 
make the fee-paid role less attractive to particular groups, for example those with child caring 
responsibilities who preferred the flexibility of a part time role and who might not have any 
desire to progress to a salaried role. Their worry was that the introduction of single non-
renewable appointments might offset the benefits to diversity brought by a quicker turnover 
of fee-paid judges, and could disproportionately disadvantage particular groups. The Law 
Society also cited concerns that those employed in law firms would need to negotiate 
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arrangements with their employer to undertake a part time fee-paid judicial role. However, 
law firms might become less amenable to letting their employees pursue a fee-paid role if 
their tenure as a fee-paid judge were time-limited or if there was uncertainty as to whether 
they would be leaving the firm for a salaried judicial role at the end of the term. Plainly, this 
was a difficult policy question with a range of competing arguments, including opposing 
arguments grounded on diversity concerns. But what was the JAC¶VYLHZ? Although it 
submitted a response to the consultation, WKH-$&¶VYLHZwas unclear.50 It failed to take a 
strong stance, choosing instead to simply offer a risks/benefits analysis of the proposal, 
including of the implications of the proposal for its own workload and resources. It may be 
that this ambivalence reflected split views on the JAC itself. However, this represents a 
missed opportunity to draw on its expertise and experience. For whatever reason, the JAC 
opted not to offer clear and deliberate leadership on a difficult question of diversity.  
 
5HIOHFWLQJRQWKH-$&¶VILUVWGHFDGHZKDWVHHPVFOHDULVWKDWFhange will only come once the 
scale of the current diversity deficit is recognised and greater weight is attached (by the JAC, 
the judiciary, ministers and the legal profession) to the importance of remedying it. What is 
also clear is that clear, positive and strategic leadership is essential to making this happen. If 
the JAC is serious about providing such leadership (and it should be) then it is important that 
every opportunity is taken to make and demonstrate this point. No doubt JAC insiders would 
say that they have been endeavouring to do all of these things, to varying degrees. The same 
insiders might also add that it can be difficult for the JAC to exhibit leadership on judicial 
diversity given the narrow constitutional space that it occupies, with the constant need to 
navigate the concerns and interests of the senior judiciary, the Ministry and the different 
branches of the legal profession. Perhaps so, but the JAC needs to be bolder. It should have 
greater confidence in its ability to weather external pressures. Similarly, it should feel more 
confident in its ability to withstand and challenge the preoccupations of ministers, a self-
interested legal profession and an embattled judiciary. After the various ups and downs of its 
first decade, the JAC has acquired some SROLWLFDOµFDSLWDO¶,t should begin to spend it.   
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